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There is a burgeoning interest among academics, practitioners and policy-makers in the relationships between 'culture' and 'development.' This embraces the now well-recognized need to adopt culturally sensitive approaches *in* development practice, the necessity of understanding the cultural dimensions *of* development and more specifically, the role of culture *for* development. Culture, in all its dimensions, is a fundamental component of sustainable development, and throughout the world, we are seeing an increasing number of governmental and non-governmental agencies turning to culture as a vehicle for economic growth, for promoting social cohesion, stability and human well-being and for tackling environmental issues. At the same time, there has been remarkably little critical debate around this relationship and even less concerned with the interventions of cultural institutions or creative industries in development agendas. The objective of the Routledge Studies in Culture and Development series is to fill this lacuna and provide a forum for reaching across academic, practitioner and policy-maker audiences.

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Contemporary Perspectives on Art and International Development

Edited by Polly Stupples and Katerina Teaiwa

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1 The Creative Economy and the Development Agenda

The Use and Abuse of 'Fast Policy'

Christiaan De Beukelaer and Justin O'Connor

Fast and Slow Policy: Introductory Remarks

Cultural policy—like all public policy—travels at different rates. Preparation for United Nations (UN) or other intergovernmental resolutions—on culture's multiple links with the sustainability agenda, for example—can be painstaking, lumbering, exhausting and above all, slow. On the other hand, we have seen 'fast policy' (Peck 2002), where ideas such as the 'creative city' and the 'creative economy' gain immediate traction in their zone of origin and rapidly circulate through what has become a global circuit of such 'fast' cultural policy. 'Fast policy' is often dismissed as a superficial fad, a quick fix adopted without scrutiny, easily available to politicians and policy makers who do not have to risk much but stand to make highly visible gains (Peck 2011). This is usually so; however, it does not necessarily follow that slow policy is always deeper, more rooted in real developments, more long term in focus. Fast policy often has the virtue of touching the *zeitgeist*, no matter how fleeting and insubstantial; slow policy may simply become out of touch, irrelevant, as it makes its way through the opaque circles of intergovernmental negotiation and bureaucratic-diplomatic processing.

The 'creative economy' is a quintessential 'fast policy' phenomenon. Initially popularized by 'New Labour' in Britain (DCMS 1998; Hewison 2014; Smith 1998), it was intended to promote the economic contribution of arts and culture to Britain as a forward-looking, post-industrial nation. However, it was rapidly taken up by those East Asian economies it sought to keep ahead of and by many developing countries who saw a new route to economic growth. From 2008, the creative economy agenda was promoted through a series of *United Nations Creative Economy Reports* (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 2010, 2013). As global debates are both crystallized in and driven by these reports, we will take them as the most tangible instance of what we call the 'creative economy debate.'

In this trajectory, the creative economy exemplifies the phenomenon of fast policy slowing down, congealing into a discourse able to frame the real across multiple locations. This is not simply a question of ideology—the reduction of the discourse of the value of culture to that of economic

benefit. As actor–network theory has helped demonstrate, this framing involves very real processes of measurement, of the creation and (re)calibration of instruments, of new sets of agents and institutions vested with the power to establish the boundaries and legitimate rules involved in a determinate set of practices—implicitly and explicitly set against other, competing ways of framing (Callon 1998, pp. 1–56). The creative economy is, in Michel Callon's sense, performative. Of course, (cultural) policy is meant to be performative, and what the creative economy discourse performs is a transformation of the debates around cultural value into debates around the economic value of that cultural value. It grounds the value of culture in the language of economic efficiency (O'Connor 2015). We invest in culture insofar as it delivers new forms of economic growth, ones that perhaps are more cost effective (low barriers to entry for individuals and cash-strapped states), more sustainable (they do not rely on resources other than the human) and point away from the past (old industry, subsidized culture) towards the rising economic model of the future, where culture has become creativity (Garnham 2005), a resource transferable and productive across all sectors of the economy.

However, if the creative economy was fast policy, it could be so because it fed off—and helped rework—a wider 'economic imaginary' (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008) of the 'new' or 'knowledge' economy (Jessop 2005). The creative economy was part of the next step in an economic evolution away from industrial production and the mass provision of public sector services towards a new kind of economy and state. 'Creative' may be dismissed as an 'empty signifier' (what, now, is not creative?), but it was also a semiotic condensation of multiple narratives articulating a reinvented future which was within our—everybody's—grasp. Creativity articulated the kind of human resources needed for a move to an innovation driven economy, but it did so in a way that drew on one of the oldest, most available reservoirs of human inventiveness and self-fulfillment: artistic creation.

The creative economy as fast policy contrasts sharply with the 'culture and development' moment in development studies in the 1990s. Throughout this period, much attention was given to a rich, diverse and theoretically substantiated debate on the role of culture in processes of development (Hermet 2000; Nederveen Pieterse 1995; Radcliffe 2006; Schech and Haggis 2000; Yousfi 2007). These arguments and ideas, which culminated in the UN Decade for Cultural Development (1988–1997), certainly gained policy traction, but nowhere near as quickly as the creative economy, nor did they move out of a well-defined cultural policy field.

In this chapter, we explore the creative economy agenda as a complex, unfolding set of discourses, tools, actors and imaginaries. We examine what happens when fast policy encounters other, older policy formations, in this case, that of 'culture and development.' This is clearly a rather large subject, so we focus our attention on the 'creative economy debate,' which attempts to combine elements of an older 'culture and development' approach (UNESCO

1998a, 1998b, 2000; WCCD 1996) with that of the creative economy. The challenge, we argue, is to connect the fast creative economy debate that has grown out of cultural (policy) studies (O'Brien 2014), geography (Pratt 2008), media and communications (Hesmondhalgh 2013) and economics (Throsby 2010; Towse 2003) to 'culture and development' thinking that is rooted in critical development studies through anthropology (Apthorpe 2005; Clammer 2012; Mosse 2005), development studies (Da Costa 2010; Nederveen Pieterse 1995) and post-colonial studies (De Beukelaer 2012).

From Cultural to Creative (and Back?)

The rise of the creative economy agenda in the 'developed world' has been extensively discussed (Hesmondhalgh 2013; O'Connor 2010, 2011). Less attention, at least until recently, has been paid to its extension outside its 'heartlands,' even though there are emerging exceptions (e.g., Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2012; De Beukelaer 2015; Fonseca Reis 2008). Though, while 'the West' has long shifted its economic policies towards services and ideas, the 'Global South' is now increasingly following suit (Miller 2009, p. 93). It is quite clear how this creative economy imaginary, its particular language, new econometrics and new kinds of actors/agencies from outside the traditional cultural policy field, quickly became a global agenda. It was picked up by those East Asian countries (Keane 2013; O'Connor and Gu 2006) trying to push their way into the 'developed countries' club, seeking to go beyond their established manufacturing success and promote the kind of high value-added economic sector that advanced services and innovation systems could provide. This happened in the first decade of the 21st century. More surprisingly, perhaps, has been the increasing take-up of this agenda in so-called 'developing' countries—including some of the poorest (De Beukelaer 2014a, 2015). This began in earnest in 2008 with the first United Nations Council for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, and was followed up with a second in 2010. Other international agencies such as the World Bank and World Intellectual Property Organisation have embraced the creative economy discourse as a key area for copyright exploitation, as have many national cultural diplomatic agencies, most especially the British Council and the International Organisation of the Francophonie, which have enthusiastically promoted the agenda throughout Africa and beyond.

No matter how fast the policy, it eventually runs into older discourses, older imaginaries, often embedded in long-standing networks of policy institutions, universities and think tanks, governmental departments and networks of cultural practitioners, activists and consultants. At the level of international agencies, it is UNESCO that has taken the lead in cultural policy and its relationship to the development agenda. UNESCO, in collaboration with other agencies, had across the 1990s developed a sophisticated understanding and critique of 'development' (WCCD 1996). It generally asserted the values and practices associated with 'culture' over against what

they saw as reductive and destructively one-sided approaches to development, as expressed in GDP. Yet mainstream development thinking remains reluctant (or unwilling) to incorporate this critique (Clammer 2012). In spite of this, the 'culture and development' approach influenced parts of UNESCO's (2005) Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. In explicitly rejecting the World Trade Organisation's reduction of cultural goods and services to commodities like any other, it also sought more positively to assert the need to provide the social and economic preconditions for equitable and diverse access to the consumption and production of culture.

There is no space here to discuss in detail the provenance of the three UN *Creative Economy Reports*. What is clear is that the creative economy debate attempts to raise some more critical issues around the creative economy agenda, drawing on the perspective of the 'culture and development' approach discussed. In particular, it asserts the importance of local development pathways and highlights some of the problematic aspects of global cultural economies as well as the opportunities they provide. As such, it is entirely compatible with the aims of the 2005 Convention—arguing the need to provide social and economic policy frameworks and support structures for local cultural production and consumption. Such local cultural economies should be about equity and diversity and should maximize the opportunities for local cultural producers to make a living from their activities.

However, as De Beukelaer (2015) has argued, although the 'culture and development' agenda tried to challenge single-minded economic developmentalism by taking the cultural context into consideration, the celebratory accounts now associated with the creative economy agenda, often uncritically adopt the teleological sense of progress, economic growth and technocratic change associated with the kind of modernist development that 'culture and development' aimed to challenge. Yet the conflation of 'culture and development' and 'creative economy' might be interpreted as tactics or diplomacy. The creative economy is a real fast policy 'brand'; it gets 'culture' to the negotiating table with the powerful economics, technology and development ministries in a way that the 'culture and development' debate never managed to do. The creative economy debate certainly performs some of this tactical work. More pointedly, the 2013 *Creative Economy Report* (UNESCO and UNDP 2013) uses the specific brand of a recurrent report established by UNCTAD in its 2008 and 2010 *Creative Economy Reports*—whatever reservations UNESCO may have about the term 'creative economy' that term must be used and some of its key economic imaginary kept intact as part of this brand.

Contradictions of the Creative Economy

To an extent, the creative economy debate illustrates the ways in which fast policy runs into the complex messiness of the real. What started off as an easy rhetoric has to deal with the realities of the object it tries to designate and form. How does this encounter change the local details of its 'rollout' and at the same time alter the basic terms of the discourse itself? Part of this messiness relates to the way fast policy creates its own success, in that many constituencies use it as a way to further an already existing agenda. In the broadest terms, the cultural sector saw the creative economy as just another way of making the argument for culture: in emphasizing the economic benefits of culture, it sought increased resources which would in turn be beneficial to culture (Hewison 2014). Pragmatism, tactics, 'rendering unto Caesar' in the name of getting culture to the top decision-making tables—these all provided the circuits for the rapid dissemination of the creative economy agenda, alongside economic agencies and other new entrants that were brought in (design, tech firms, SMEs etc.). This new approach towards government often brought in new sectoral actors who welcomed the change of emphasis towards entrepreneurialism or commercial markets, and new sources of funding, such as from economic and trade departments. However, such new strategies have real consequences for the detailed implementation of creative economy policies, as well as provoking new conflicts of voice (or exit) around the agenda.

Such tactics might be effective in the short term, but they lack the robustness required to negotiate difficult strategic choices, when a policy narrative is tested against the competing interests and dynamics of the real. This is reflected in the creative economy debate that favors positive outcomes over critical engagement with challenges. The focus on positives reveals not only a desire to be upbeat, but also to hold together a complex and flimsy coalition. This conceals both the limited social inclusion that can be attained through arts, culture and creative industries (Belfiore 2002; Oakley 2006) and the negative spillovers of creative industries policies (Peck 2005). Moreover, it fails to consider the full extent to which creativity is rooted in uncertainty and thus is prone to failure (Bilton 2010; Menger 2009). Beyond these general points of critique on the creative economy, we will highlight three ways in which the 2013 *Creative Economy Report* (CER) (UNESCO and UNDP 2013), as the most explicit exponent of the 'global' creative economy debate, has not quite connected to the messy context it operates in.

First, there are no bad examples in the 2013 CER. By this, we mean a focus on failed or outright problematic projects that highlight the difficulty to attain the success of the 'best practices' on display. Yet our call for 'bad examples' does not signify a cynical stance towards success: there is increasing debate on the necessity to recognize, acknowledge and understand failure and its underlying reasons in development practice.[1] This does not mean that the 2013 CER, or any policy document, should be turned into a naming-and-shaming show of (un)known failed projects. Rather, it should invite all stakeholders involved to be more open about what does not work, and why certain elements, processes or relations posed problems in their practice. Surely, we can learn from best practices, but we can also learn from (our own) mistakes by confronting them more explicitly and perhaps more publicly.

The 2013 CER in fact mentions one 'bad' example, but presents it as a 'best practice': a micro-finance project has been set up in Ghana between the Institute for Music and Development (IMD), ARB Apex Bank and the Danish Centre for Culture and Development (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, p. 117). To date, this has, however, not yielded the expected result, and the project is currently dormant. Why not try to convey details about the encountered difficulties in the 2013 CER or on the IMD website in order to avoid future obstacles—or even failure—in other countries or cultural industries? This is merely one of many examples where failure should not be seen as the end of a project, but merely as one step in a long road to better practices. This is the way the IMD actually looks at the project (De Beukelaer 2014b, p. 95); yet, the 2013 CER falls short in conveying this.

Second, mobility remains a significant issue among artists and creatives. This occurs at three levels: emotional, legal and practical. It is no coincidence that we mention emotional first. The shaming of any visa applicant wanting to travel to Europe or the U.S. is emotionally taxing. Disclosing your life story and financial status to a stranger is no pleasure, especially since this in no way guarantees that you will be granted temporary access to the country of destination. Yet, legally speaking, according to Article 14 of the UNESCO (2005) Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, parties[2] engaged to 'provid[e] support for creative work and facilitating the mobility, to the extent possible, of artists from the developing world' (UNESCO 2005). This remains, to considerable extent, a dead letter. Many artists are still refused entry to countries that are party to the convention. While lip service is paid to the importance of cultural and creative industries, many countries remain rather closed to artists looking to engage with their audiences.

Granted, some artists in the past have blatantly abused the rather lax regulations on artists' visas to disappear upon disembarkation. It would thus be unfair to blame the countries of destination alone, even though travel regulations to countries like the UK and Australia have become highly restrictive. While these measures are part of a larger reactionary tendency in migration politics, this does not make the situation any easier for many *bona fide* artists, upcoming and established.[3] Culture and creativity are indeed mostly actively concentrated in cities, as the 2013 CER highlights, but artists and entrepreneurs thrive by local and global connections. The severe imbalance that exists, no matter its origins or politics, in the possibility of mobility for people with different passports does not do the creative economy any good.

Third, the 2013 CER maintains the divide between 'developed' and 'developing' countries and focuses on the latter explicitly. The engagement with examples, practices and ideas from 'developing' countries is a much-needed addition to the debate on the role of cultural and creative industries in societies. It is important because most attention in academia has been on so-called developed countries, largely ignoring the particularities in practices and strategies that exist around the world.

While we understand and applaud the explicit engagement of the report with the conditions and contexts in 'developing' countries, we equally regret the near-absence[4] of meaningful interaction with cities and regions in 'developed' countries.[5] Is a rigid divide between two groups of countries the best way to flag that there is some degree of difference? How does the difference between 'developed' countries that are in 'crisis,' between 'developing' countries that are 'emerging' and an Africa that is 'rising' pan out in the old-fashioned divide between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'? After all, this division is not a mere reflection of a neutral reality, but the result of politicized discursive choices (Escobar 1995).

There are indeed differences, yet we propose an end to the rigid demarcation of 'developed' and 'developing' countries. By building on the examples and theories of 'developed' countries as inspiration for 'developing countries' while saying that the situation in the latter is *different*, little justice is done to the actual challenges that exist in diverse contexts. More crucially, employing this binary foregoes the not-so-simple discussion concerning the actual differences between places around the world. Perhaps we need to recognize more explicitly that Detroit can actually learn from Johannesburg.

While these challenges are known and acknowledged by virtually all stakeholders in the creative economy, there is an aspect of being unwilling to draw attention to them for fear of introducing dissent and problems into the agenda. There are deeper issues, as fast policy hits longer standing agendas and actors. In a certain sense, there is a deliberate avoidance of depth, or a rewriting of one history over another. The palimpsest of policy and practices remain un(der)explored (De Beukelaer 2015).

In this context, history matters. UNESCO—or anyone, for that matter—is unlikely to disagree with us on this point, yet little attention is paid to the importance of history in the context of the creative economy—or rather its displacement of other histories. Chapter Five of the 2013 CER opens with a section on path dependency, illustrating how history matters for the emergence of particular cultural industries in Japan and Mexico (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, p. 90). Further engagement with evolutionary economics, where path dependency forms an important part, is, however, relegated to a footnote (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, p. 26).

Underlying questions about the history of cultural politics and policies remain insufficiently explored. What discourse existed previously? How was culture previously linked to development, or why wasn't it? What initiatives existed to support the cultural sector? What kind of policies have proven (in)effective in specific places, and why? What local politics helped or obstructed the consolidation of a cultural sector? What are the remnants of colonial rule in cultural policies (of public policy in general)? What general traces of (post-)colonial influences prevail when thinking about identity, class and ideology?[6] These tensions illustrate the difficulty of the 'fast and catchy' policy to connect to the complex realities it is meant to deal with. While the 2013 CER makes a necessary and important step to bridge this

gap, it is unclear if the creative economy is equipped to internalize the contradictions of 'development.'

Limits of the Creative Economy as Development Policy

As we noted above, though a piece of 'fast policy,' the creative economy condensed a number of themes. The release of the concept of the 'creative economy' into the policy ecosystem in the early 2000s introduced a new dynamic. Culture, and the particular kind of creativity associated with it, was to be promoted not as a supplement to, or modification of, GDP-led economic growth, but as a deepening of it. Culture, in the form of the creative industries, became available to local development strategies as a range of potentially profitable products and services. In addition, the growing importance of intellectual property rights within the large cultural corporations suggested a close affinity, if not a merger, of the creative industries with the wider mobilization of capacities required for a 'knowledge economy.' However, part of the success of the creative industries in mobilizing support was not just its narrative of cultural and economic 'win-win.' Its focus on contemporary and emergent kinds of cultural production, appealing to youth, new technologies and cultural practices outside the staid and elitist hierarchies of 'high art' and heritage, suggested a force of democratization. Finally, 'creativity' invoked the anthropological resource of culture in a new way. Creativity would, it was frequently argued, no longer be locked up in the elitist or at least specialized arts; now an 'everyday' democratic creativity would be linked to the necessarily (they were not subsidized) entrepreneurial energy of independent creative businesses that would galvanize local economies (e.g., Hartley 2005).

In addition, however, we need to look at some of the limitations of the culture and development agenda of the 1990s. The terms 'creative industries' and 'cultural industries' are, we would argue, not interchangeable (Garnham 2005; Hesmondhalgh 2013). The cultural (including media) industries—the mass production and distribution of symbolic goods and services—have long been seen as an essential part of national identity in 'developed' countries and crucial to nation-building in 'developing' countries. The support and regulation of the broadcast and print media especially were seen as essential to processes of modernization, and only latterly linked to possible economic spin-offs. They were usually subsidized. The deregulation and globalization of (Northern-dominated) media industries in the 1980s and 1990s—linked to the new digital technologies of satellite and the Internet, as well as new legal and logistical technologies—undermined this nation-building model. Here, the theme of cultural diversity crossed with an older debate within UNESCO—that of the New World Information and Communication Order.[7] This movement attempted to redress the one-way flow of information and communication from developed to developing countries. Complex in its geopolitics, it was more or less defeated by the early 1980s—a period

which marked the rise of neo-liberalism in the U.S. and UK and a new phase of media deregulation and globalization.

In this sense, protecting national cultural industries—asserting the rights of states to make an exception of cultural goods and services within GATT and then WTO agreements—seemed a legitimate aspect of the cultural diversity agenda and was acknowledged as such in the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (De Beukelaer, Pyykkönen and Singh 2015). However, there are some problems with this. First, though its demise has been greatly overstated (Calhoun 1994), the nation-state is no longer seen to be the unique source, or guarantor, of local cultural identity in the face of a Western-dominated global modernity. New digital and logistical infrastructures of global exchange have opened new possibilities for diverse local production even as they have brought the dominant global media players to the front doorstep, merely changing the *context* but not the nature of the 'cultural exception' (Guèvremont 2015).

For many critics, all this suggested—and continues to do so—a folding together of the 'culture and development' agenda with commodification and the forces of neoliberalism (McGuigan 2004). At the moment—as exemplified in the creative economy debate—they exist in juxtaposition, or the creative economy agenda shunts 'culture and development' to the margins, or the latter simply exits from the debate.

Yet, perhaps this suggests a new challenge, in which these two agendas need to learn to talk to one another (De Beukelaer 2015; Oakley and O'Connor 2015; Pratt 2014). It demands recognition of the limitations of both 'culture and development' and of the creative economy. There is then a radical uncertainty or ambiguity at the heart of the creative economy debate, and this in turn articulates a wider sense of uncertainty or conflict of imaginaries. This can provide a space to bend or shift or reframe, or it might lead to confusion and incoherence or even a kind of double-speak, emphasizing culture to one audience and economic development to another.

Art, Culture or Creativity?

What is the position of art in relation to the creative economy and the 'culture and development' agendas? Throughout the three *Creative Economy Reports*, there is much focus on both 'culture' and 'creativity,' but the position of 'art' in this debate is somewhat uncertain. Some supporters of the creative economy agenda would explicitly exclude 'art' or 'the arts' from the creative industries (Potts et al. 2008). This position is echoed by its critics, who suggest that art has been completely sidelined in favor of 'innovation' (Oakley 2009; Oakley and O'Connor 2015). However, in the original DCMS (1998) formulation,[8] and with most accounts of the cultural and creative industries/economy, 'the arts' are included as part of the sector. We might add that the whole creative cities agenda, whether linked to Richard

Florida (2002) or Charles Landry (2000), had the arts as central to the cultural offer of the city (Grodach and Silver 2013).

The arts have been present in other ways, too. As noted above (and elsewhere, cf. Oakley and O'Connor 2015), the notion of creativity being put into play in the creative economy has been explicitly linked to the kind of imagination, experimentation and unorthodox 'method in the madness' working practices associated with figure of the artist. This particular concept of the artist is associated with Enlightenment and Romantic notions of 'genius' and was deeply ingrained in the humanist aspirations behind the establishment of UNESCO after World War Two. On the other hand, the rise of the culture and development strand within UNESCO was also associated with a longer tradition in which 'art' was to be seen as one part—perhaps only a minor one—of a wider anthropological view of culture. Indeed, one of the key resources for challenging the uni-linear, Western-centric model of development was this anthropological notion of 'everyday' culture, in all its diversity. This emphasis on the anthropological not only asserted the validity and the human necessity of what were often dismissed or patronized as 'traditional' cultures as part of any concept of development, but it also rejected the implicit hierarchy contained in the Western emphasis on art as the pinnacle of human civilization.

This distinction can be traced back to two foundational works of cultural policy and anthropology that were published almost simultaneously: Mathew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and Edward Tyler's *Primitive Culture* (1871). Arnold framed culture more narrowly as art and literature—'the best that has been thought and said,' and the idea of its uplifting role has its roots in the French and German Enlightenments. Additionally, through the movements of Romanticism and Modernism, art (as defined in Western aesthetics) was given a privileged role as an expression of pure human creativity often denied in other parts of society, notably 'the economy.' Tyler, on the other hand, took an anthropological approach. He defined culture as 'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.' Culture was defined broadly as all that which is not determined by nature. Though claiming general validity as an account of human society, this approach was mostly directed towards 'primitive' or 'traditional' societies.

Arnold's approach deeply informed much of Western cultural policy up to 1945 and beyond. Critics such as Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart (the former Assistant Director-General at UNESCO from 1971 to 1975) stressed its elitism and its denigrating of 'ordinary culture.' Anthropologists also took issue with Tyler's notion of 'primitive culture' for having an implicit hierarchy whereby these primitive cultures are positioned on a (potential) teleological trajectory towards the 'civilized' as indexed against their ability to produce 'art.' Later anthropologists—such as Franz Boas and Margaret Meade—asserted the validity of traditional cultures as human

meaning systems and thus actively informed the later agendas of cultural diversity (Bennett 2013).

The anthropological critique of Arnoldian 'high culture'—that culture is part of a wider society and not the preserve of an educated and Western(ized) elite—is now part of the language of contemporary democratic cultural politics. But where does that leave the notion of 'art'? Though it is common to use the term 'art' to describe artifacts, stories, literatures, music, performances and so on coming from all times and all places, historians tell us that the term and the concept of 'art' comes from Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century. As Jacques Rancière (2013, p. ix) wrote recently:

> [E]ven if histories of art begin their narratives with cave paintings at the dawn of time, Art as a notion designating a specific form of experience has only existed in the West since the end of the 18th century.

It is here that a distinct realm of practice, 'creative' in a way that was different from mere artisan handicraft, and knowing the world differently from science or morality, came into being. For many critics, of course, this was tied up with elitism, class society and the separation of the cultivated from the ignorant masses—the 'rise of the bourgeoisie.' This is undeniable in large part, but with it came two other elements. First, 'art' became a new site or set of tools for governments to work on populations in new ways, as a distinct realm separate from the 'everyday' (Bennett 1998, 2013; Hunter 1988). It was used to civilize them, to make them into citizens, to make them into self-governing liberal subjects, to actualize their potential. Second, the distinct realm of 'art' came to hold up certain ideals—of freedom, or self-fulfillment, of a harmonious society—against the world of economy and administration. These notions of culture-as-art are still with us and inform cultural policy in recognizable ways. Third, the tension between 'art' and 'culture' has also built on the paradoxical opposition between inherited and shared customs and traditions, on the one hand, and a striving for new forms of individuality, on the other. As William Ray (2001, p. 16) puts it, culture,

> tells us to think of ourselves as being who we are because of what we have in common with all the other members of our society and community, but it also says we develop a distinctive particular identity by virtue of our efforts to know and fashion ourselves as individuals.

Such issues all raise large philosophical and historical questions, ones we are unable to address here. The key point is that in any attempt to understand global creative economy policy, the couplet—so slippery and all embracing—of 'art and culture' needs much closer scrutiny.

First, the (hierarchical) distinction between 'art' and (anthropological) culture no longer ideologically maps onto the Global North and South, or perhaps there is now greater recognition that this simplistic distinction

(should have) never quite covered the complexity of global relations. It is not only that the cultures of the South have now gained their recognition and legitimacy, even if the 'culture game' of the art trade remains an unequal affair (Oguibe 2004). The tensions between art and culture that emerged in eighteenth-century Europe—individual/communal, disruptive/constructive, future-oriented/traditional, innovative/preservative and so on—now pervade the globe.

Second, asserting the anthropological notion of culture (everyday or ordinary culture, or as a 'way of life') can no longer automatically define a democratic cultural policy either against the Global North or against 'the arts,' wherever they are. We can see this very clearly in the creative industries. These gained a strong democratic charge by claiming to open up avenues of 'everyday' creativity outside of the established arts. Yet, at the same time, this notion of creativity drew (explicitly and implicitly) on that classic artistic creativity of disruption, innovation, individual drive and restlessness. In this case, of course, artistic creativity was to be used as a resource for economic innovation and growth rather than a residual value to be set against 'the economic'. Artistic creativity is therefore very ambiguous (Pang 2012). On the one hand, it can be branded as elitism, despising the unsophisticated pleasures of the masses and/or cozying up to the wealthy and powerful. On the other, it becomes a new human resource to be exploited for innovation economies or the symbolic capital of aspiring global cities. Might there be a need to be more explicit about the role of 'art' as a particular form of culture within cultural policy?

Art has been part of the critique as well as the celebration of power; free circulation of 'artistic' goods part of civil society as well as the market; a distinct realm of citizenship and human empathy as well as a site of liberal governmentality and state building. Art has been part of establishing colonial superiority over 'backwards' countries; it has also been a way of claiming global citizenship against local states, of embracing the future against the oppressive past. Despite being frequently relegated to heritage, to pre-industrial or analogue culture, to a neo-feudal accompaniment to early capitalism, might not art's disruptive, individualizing and empowering aspects in many ways mark contemporary world *not less, but more* than ever before?

From Culture and Development to Cultural Economy

There is certainly a need to make more explicit the inherent uncertainty and contradiction at the core of artistic practice. We need to be clearer about the value being claimed for art working within arguments in support of culture. That is, alongside culture as anthropological 'fact' (see, e.g,. Appadurai 2013)—people act in certain ways with certain world views and customs and so we have to work with these for development initiatives to work—is culture as 'value'—these meaning systems are part of what it is to be human, to have human dignity. These two aspects are intertwined in the

'culture and development' approach that sees culture as both means and end of development.

These ideas perhaps found their most coherent policy expression through the World Commission on Culture and Development, set up by the UN and UNESCO in 1993, and in its report *Our Creative Diversity* (WCCD 1996). Its opening statement was: 'Development divorced from its human or cultural context is growth without a soul.' Culture can be, in the words of two World Bank economists, 'harnessed for positive social and economic transformation through [its] influence on aspirations, the co-ordination of collective action, and the ways in which power and agency work within a society' (Rao and Walton 2004, p. 4). But culture is an end as well as a means. Development, according to Amartya Sen (2004) and others, is an entitlement to a dignified way of life, and culture is absolutely central to this. It is for these reasons that Lourdes Arizpe—who supervised the 1998 *World Culture Report*—could write: 'Culture is not embedded in development but development embedded in culture' (Arizpe 2004, p. 181).

The emphasis on culture as both anthropological fact and human value needs to be understood in relation to the great 'other' of culture: the economy. 'Culture and development' was a rejection of neo-classical economic models and *homo economicus* (De Beukelaer 2012). In asserting the need to take other forms of meanings into account beyond that of abstract economic rationality, it asserted both the fact of culture—people actually see and act upon the world in ways that neo-classical economics cannot understand—and introduced the possibility of extra-economic meanings and values as grounds for judging the success of any process of *actual* human development.

Culture and development engaged in a process of 're-embedding' the economy in anthropological culture. However, first, this tended to give culture a normatively positive value—breaking with abstract economic man—and introducing a kind of 'embedded culture good/disembedded economy bad' binary. Second, this generated a highly ambivalent value for 'art,' which could be seen as specific 'organic' expressions of this culture or as a second-order disembedding, or separating out of culture from everyday life towards professional and elite practice. This ambiguity is at play in cultural policy formulations of 'art and culture,' where argumentation slides between the terms but cannot bring itself to elide them. Third, as noted above, culture and development was unable to deal adequately with the creative economy agenda. Here was a form of cultural production that was, in part, structured around global 'disembedded' markets and whose developmental 'pay-off' was couched in economic metrics of jobs and money. In addition, it was presented as a liberation of everyday democratic creativity and assertion of popular cultures against the state-heavy worlds of art and heritage. In this context, culture and development's positioning of art as some disembedded form of culture merely played into the hands of the creative economy.

In this context, it is 'art' as much as anthropological culture that continues to provide its traditional historical opposition to 'pure' economic or

governmental rationality (cf., O'Connor 2015). One of the key sources of opposition to the creative economy agenda has been from those who reject the reduction of art to economic logics (cf., Hewison 2014). This can be seen in the work of both Bourdieu (1996) and Rancière (2010), who see the historical specificity of art (with all its complex bourgeois, governmental and Eurocentric aspects) as nevertheless a space of autonomy and dissent that we lose at our peril.

Nevertheless, the new forms of intersection between art, culture and economy articulated in the creative economy agenda—however distorted—are not to be avoided, nor is the proliferation of 'artistic' energies and aspirations beyond the established art world which that agenda also proclaimed. In order to capture this, we prefer the term 'cultural economy.' This is not cultural economics—where the 'economic' is the business dimension of the cultural product, to be discussed in relative isolation by (sympathetic) economists. Nor it is that form of cultural anthropology that sees culture as a distinct ontological realm of meaning opposed to, and threatened by, disembedded markets driven by abstract economic logics.

Cultural economy recognizes that contemporary cultural production is an economy—it has contracts, markets, jobs, copyright and so on—but refuses to accept that economy as an external given which culture must either oppose or accommodate. The values produced, distributed and consumed in the cultural economy cannot be separated from the practices and institutional arrangements through which they are produced.

This, of course, is a political economy of culture approach (cf., Hesmondhalgh 2013), which strongly marked media and cultural industries policy thinking in the 1980s and early 1990s, and which had a significant impact on UNESCO and the 2005 Convention. Cultural economy, by extension, is a way of registering the proliferation of cultural production outside of the large cultural industry systems which political economy tended to address—a proliferation of aspiration towards cultural work and a proliferation of connections between the sphere of 'culture' and the rest of the 'economy.' However, cultural economy is much more explicit than political economy in asserting that the values expressed in 'art' and in 'culture' should have a greater say in how its forms of work, markets, regulation, subsidy and policy infrastructure should be organized.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored some of problematic aspects of the creative economy agenda. More particularly, we have tried to show how the ambiguities and evasions reflect an historical conjuncture in the creative economy debate through which the frictions between the 'culture and development' and 'creative economy' agendas may open up new spaces for thinking cultural policy, or result in incoherence or the discursive violence

of a market-driven innovation program. We looked in some detail at the ambiguities of art and/or culture: do we see art as a residual category confined to the heritage sector of the creative economy, or are its values in fact coming to be more dispersed, more global than ever before? We ended by evoking a reconsideration of the term 'cultural economy' in which the different strands of political economy, culture and development and creative economy thinking might be productively brought together (Gibson and Kong 2005).

We began by contrasting fast and slow policy. We suggested that the 'culture and development' agenda had come out of a long process of practical and critical work across different national and international bodies. In contrast, we see the creative economy as an ad hoc neologism, which nevertheless has captured the policy imagination of countries and cities around the globe. We are witnessing fast policy turning into slow policy.

This might not mean a deepening of our understanding of the concept and its accommodation and alterations of previous policy settings. Slow policy may simply adopt the flimsiness of fast policy and embed this in the diplomatic-bureaucratic world of cultural policy. Thus, the well-rehearsed ambiguity of the term 'creative industries' in terms of statistics (does it include ICT or design, should this be cultural and creative etc.) (Tremblay 2011) and indeed, as to what its economic impact consists of through employment (e.g., Markusen et al. 2008; Ross 2007) or innovation (e.g., Pratt and Jeffcutt 2009) or tourism (e.g., Richards 2011) etc. have persisted alongside more ideological oppositions to its agenda (e.g., Lovink and Rossiter 2007; McGuigan 2009). Does anyone really have a clear idea of what a creative economy policy agenda might actually consist of? Are there really grounds for modification, adaptation, feedback and redirection—or is it simply the dead hand of policy formulations to be trotted out but not really taken seriously?

In its attempt to get culture into the Millennium Development Goals and the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, the senior leadership of UNESCO has asserted the role of culture as a driver for development (see, e.g., the 2013 Hangzhou Declaration; the 2013 CER; and the 2014 Florence Declaration).[9] Yet this form of 'development' linked to culture is no longer in some sort of opposition to economically oriented development, as the 'post-development' literature claimed (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997), but is merely a supplement to it. 'Culture' is to be used to attain an array of (human) development goals, none of which appear to in be in any kind of tension with any other, and are all equally attainable:

> Adequately nurtured, creativity fuels culture, infuses a human-centred development and constitutes the key ingredient for job creation, innovation and trade while contributing to social inclusion, cultural diversity and environmental sustainability.
>
> (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010, p. xix)

The data presented to systematically explore this influence focuses on economic trade to fit into the crudest and most problematic measure of development: the growth of the GDP. The declaration manages to reconcile this multifunctional positive contribution of culture by inserting it into a kind of superficial historical narrative of a progression from agriculture, to industry, to services, to a 'creative economy' that no economic historian or sociologist would take seriously.

Cultural policy globally faces a moment of crisis and opportunity. The post-1945 development paradigm outlined a singular path in which developing countries were to move from 'traditional' to 'modern' societies (Escobar 1995). Cultural policy has been deeply implicated in this paradigm in the past, as a way to legitimize the nation state as a driver of this development process. Nevertheless, cultural agencies like UNESCO did seek to challenge or modify this paradigm, asserting the centrality of culture and cultural diversity to individuals and societies. This challenge was strengthened by the anti-colonial movement (and later world system theorists), which argued that the geopolitical 'game' was rigged in favor of developed countries (Chang 2002). This was also joined by a growing anthropological argument for the equal validity and continued relevance of 'traditional' cultures, themselves no longer seen as static. Both challenged the implicit hierarchy whereby the 'art' and civilization of the West represented a higher form of spiritual achievement, and both promoted local, non-Western cultures as vital resources for development and nation-building. These tendencies converged in the 'cultural and development' agenda that animated much of UNESCO's work, culminating in the 2005 Convention.

Underlying much of this discourse was an attempt to assert the centrality to any social development of a set of values and meanings over and above those allowed by neo-classical economics. We have tried to show how in different contexts and in different ways, both 'art' and 'culture' have articulated values opposed to economy and administration. The creative economy disrupted these settings. Fast policy can crystalize the zeitgeist, or at any rate, its speed relates to the paucity of existing policies and/or the presence of forces that seize on such policies as immediately desirable. In a very schematic way, we could characterize the creative economy agenda as the move of neo-liberalism into the heart of cultural policy. No longer dismissing it as unproductive, wasteful and left-wing, culture now becomes productive of new jobs, new wealth and new subjectivities.

We have seen in this chapter that there are grounds to suggest that the 'culture and development' approach failed to deal adequately with the economic and cultural dynamics of the cultural and creative industries or with the changing status of the nation-state under globalization. As a consequence, the fast policy agenda of the creative economy was able to make enormous headway in global cultural policy circuits. We have suggested that the creative economy agenda in turn fails to engage the range of issues and problems with which 'culture and development' was concerned and which

have not disappeared even if they have changed. Core to this failure are an avoidance of sustainability and social justice issues and a refusal to deal with the questions of non-economic value which culture articulates. It is to these that any progressive cultural policy must address itself.

This moment of cultural policy crisis offers both challenge and opportunity. Two paradigms are found wanting. We have suggested the need for a more direct engagement with the economy of culture, one we have called 'cultural economy.' This extends the work of the political economy of culture—where that economy is seen as constructed within specific historical socio-political agencies—into a new context in which 'culture' can no longer be seen as opposed to 'economy,' nor reduced to it. It asserts the right to judge the arrangement of the cultural economy in the light of the cultural values which produce, and are produced by, that cultural economy.

Notes

1. See, for example, the website http://www.admittingfailure.com/.
2. Most EU countries are party to the convention; however, the U.S. is not.
3. For a detailed discussion and examples, see the special issue on Art and Mobility of *Interartive*: http://artmobility.interartive.org/
4. Memphis (p. 37) and Rotterdam (p. 117) are mentioned in the report.
5. Elsewhere, De Beukelaer (2014a) has paid greater attention to the contentious role the dualistic divide plays in the reading of creative economy trade data.
6. Colonial legacies are mentioned in passing in the 2013 CER (on pp. 38, 59 and 87). They should, however, receive far greater attention when looking into (cultural) policy issues.
7. The NWICO was a movement of developing countries organized around UNESCO in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It sought to challenge the dominance of the developed world over flows of information and communication. As such, it was part of a wider mobilization of developing countries against what they saw as the barriers to development placed in their path by the already existing developed countries. It was defeated in the 1980s by a U.S.-led coalition of developed countries. Cf. *Media, Culture and Society*, special issue on 'Farewell to NWICO?' (Sparks and Roach 1990).
8. The Department of Culture Media and Sports was the body under New Labour in the UK from 1997 to 2010 that popularized the use of 'creative industries' and proposed a sector classification system (DCMS 1998).
9. This is also reflected in the personal messages of UNESCO Director General Irina Bokova and UNDP Administrator Helen Clark, 'Let's put culture on the agenda now!' https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWS3UPqm9iU

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